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Abstract
This paper studies the political sustainability of programs that are targeted towards the poor. Given that
the poor to whom these programs cater do not constitute a majority, we show that for their own good
it pays to let the middle class benet from them in a random way. This approach mimics the actual
institutional arrangements whereby middle-class individuals feel that they can successfully apply to the
programs. We consider a two stage decision process: rst a Rawlsian government chooses the probability
at which the middle class is allowed to benet from a given program; then, majority voting determines
the level of benet and the rate of contribution. At the rst, constitutional stage, the government cannot
commit to a specic level of taxes and benet but anticipates that these are set by majority voting in the
second stage.
Keywords: Targeted transfers; Political support; Redistribution paradox.
JEL classication: H23; D72; H50
1 Introduction
In a number of countries there exist means-testing assistance targeted towards the poor. They cover all
sorts of needs: health, housing, pensions, income maintenance, long-term care (LTC). In this paper, we use
as an example LTC assistance programs. These programs are supposed to cover those who cannot purchase
private insurance or self-insure. One, however, observes that in most cases there are loopholes in means-
testing: individuals who could aord paying for their LTC end up receiving benets from the program. In
other words, means-testing is not always strictly enforced and this has ramications, which have hitherto
received little attention. For example, in many US states, an elderly person may own a home valued at
$802,000, plus home furnishings, jewellery and an automobile of uncapped value while receiving long-term
Medicaid support. In addition, they are allowed to have various life insurance policies, retirement accounts
with unlimited assets and a dened-benet pension plan. By most standards, such a person is considered
wealthy and yet he benets from an assistance program.1 We would like to understand why governments
allow for such exceptions in their means-testing policy. Our conjecture is that these exceptions are designed
in such a way that the LTC program gets enough political support. The idea is that to have a majority in
favor of a LTC assistance program one needs to add to the population of poor part of the middle class. This
issue is related to the literature on the redistribution paradox2 and that on the political economy of social
security3. The message of this line of research is that the only way to ensure the political sustainability of
a public scheme is to allow the middle class to benet in part from it. Alternatively, the idea is that social
benets should be partially related to either earnings or contributions. The gist of all that literature is
that a program for the poor is a poor program.
De Donder and Peluso (2018) also show that public aid received by a minority of the population may
be supported by majority voting when voters see the attribution of the aid as being stochastic. However,
their analysis is merely of a positive nature, and they do not consider policy design which is our main
focus. We rst show that for the good of the poorest part of the population it pays to let the middle
class benet from the public scheme in a random way that mimics the actual institutional arrangements
whereby middle-class individuals feel that they can successfully apply to the program. We then explore
the optimal choice of the government in more detail. The model we have in mind comprises two stages.
In the rst stage the government decides about the probability that the middle class can benet from the
public scheme, with the objective of maximizing the welfare of the worst-o, and in the second stage there
is a majority vote on the level of benets. We consider a society made of three types of individuals: the
poor, the middle-class and the rich. The poor benet from the public scheme with probability one, the
middle class with a probability to be determined and the rich with a zero probability. The government
levies a tax of rate τ to nance a at public benet g.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, while section 3 discusses the second
1Cremer and Pestieau (2018)
2Korpi and Palme (1998)
3Casamatta et al. (2000 a,b)
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stage of the game, i.e. the problem of a middle-class individual who is decisive in the majority vote. Section
4 analyzes the rst stage, i.e. the problem of the government, by rst studying the analytical problem and
then discussing some numerical results. Finally, the last section provides some concluding remarks.
2 Model
Consider a society with 3 types of individuals: poor (type 1), middle-class (type 2) and rich (type 3), with
exogenous incomes w1 < w2 < w3. Their shares in the society n1, n2 and n3 are such that n1 < 1/2,
n1 +n2 > 1/2 and n1 +n2 +n3 = 1. In words, the poor and the middle class represent a majority, but no
group includes more than half of total population.
We study a public scheme which provides a means-tested benet g nanced by a linear income tax at
rate τ . We consider a single period in which the three types of individuals may benet from the scheme
with dierent probabilities. Let πi ∈ [0, 1] (for i = 1, 2, 3) denote the probability for type i to qualify for
the means-tested benet g. Expected utility of a type i individual is given by:
Ui = πiu (wi(1− τ) + g) + (1− πi)u(wi(1− τ))
with u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) < 0.4
We further assume that π1 = 1 and π3 = 0, while π2 is to be determined. In other words, we assume
that the poor benet from the public scheme for sure, the rich can never benet from it, whereas it may
be optimal for the government to leave some loopholes in the means-testing so that the middle class has
a non-zero chance to benet from the program.
The model has two stages. In the rst one, the government chooses the level of π2 by maximizing the
Rawlsian social welfare function, that is the welfare of the worst-o (type 1) individuals. In the second
stage, there is a majority vote on the level of benets or, equivalently, on the level of the tax rate τ . First
period decisions are made anticipating the induced voting equilibrium in stage 2.
Proceeding by backward induction, we start by solving the second stage. From our assumptions it
is clear that the median voter is a type 2 individual. Therefore, given the government's chosen π2, the
resulting tax rate will be the one preferred by the individuals of type 2. We analyze the problem of a type
2 individual in the next section.
4In the case of LTC, this can be seen as focusing on elderly individuals in need of LTC. In other words, we can assume
that all individuals in the model need LTC, but not everyone qualies for the public aid. Moreover, we can focus on the
individuals' post-retirement stage, i.e. instead of modeling explicitly their consumption and saving decisions made before
retirement, assume that the individuals save a constant share s of their disposable income and consume the rest. We can
then abstract from the individuals' utility of consumption before retirement and normalize s to 1, which amounts to saying
that the individuals arrive to the post-retirement stage with a wealth equal to wi(1 − τ), for i = 1, 2, 3.
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3 Problem of a middle-class individual
Given the government's chosen π2, the utility of a middle-class (type 2) individual writes as
U2 = π2u (w2(1− τ) + g) + (1− π2)u(w2(1− τ)).
The levels of τ and g are related by the government's budget constraint which is given by
(π2n2 + n1) g = τw̄,






















− (1− π2)u′(c̃2)w2 ≤ 0, (1)
where c2 = w2(1− τ) + g and c̃2 = w2(1− τ).
The expression shows that a higher tax rate has two eects on the individual. On the one hand, it
creates a cost by reducing the individual's disposable income; on the other hand, it creates a benet by
increasing the public transfer that the individual may receive if he is lucky. The cost is certain, while
the benet is obtained with probability π2.
We rst derive the condition for τ > 0. To do this, we set τ = 0, which implies g = 0 and so
u′(c2) = u













This expression shows that type 2 individuals vote for a strictly positive tax rate, and thus a non-zero
public benet when their probability to benet from the public scheme is high enough, and clearly strictly
positive. In other words, the public scheme can be politically sustainable only when the probability for
the middle class to receive the benets is suciently large.5
5We assume w2n1 < w̄ − w2n2 because otherwise, w2n1/ (w̄ − w2n2) ≥ 1, and so π2 would have to be greater than 1.
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− (1− π2)u′(c̃2)w2 = 0 (3)























+ (1− π2)u′′(c̃2)w22 < 0
is the second-order condition for τ , which is satised given the concavity of u. Consequently, the voting
equilibrium tax rate increases with π2.
4 Problem of the government
We now move to the rst stage where the government has to determine the optimal level of π2. We rst
derive the problem analytically and then provide some numerical results.
4.1 Analytical problem
We consider a Rawlsian government which maximizes the utility of the worst-o (type 1) individuals. The



























First, we can easily see that having π2 ≤ π̂2 is not optimal. Recall that π̂2, dened by (2) is the
threshold which has to be exceeded to obtain a strictly positive voting equilibrium tax rate. Consequently,
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Consequently, even though the government is concerned only about the well-being of the individuals of
type 1, it is still optimal to allow the type 2 individuals to benet from the public scheme with a non-zero
probability.












This expression shows that the choice of π2 involves a tradeo. On the one hand, making it easier for the
middle class to benet from the scheme increases the number of the beneciaries of the program and thus,
for a given tax revenue, decreases the size of the benet obtained by each recipient. This is reected by
the second term in the numerator of (4). On the other hand, a higher π2 ensures a higher equilibrium
tax rate, which has two eects. First, it allows increasing the tax revenue and thus the level of the public
benet. However, it also means that the poor will have to pay higher taxes, which is a negative eect on
them. Nevertheless, because the rst term in the numerator of (4) can easily be shown to be positive,
the positive impact of the increase in the public benet outweighs the negative eect of higher taxes for
the poor. To sum up, a higher equilibrium tax rate overall aects the individuals of type 1 positively.
Therefore, the optimal level of π2 needs to strike a balance between this positive eect of being able to
sustain a higher tax rate and the negative eect of having to divide the public benet among a larger
number of individuals.
We further investigate this problem by considering a specic utility function and looking at some
numerical examples.
4.2 Numerical results
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We provide some numerical examples in which we explore how the optimal value of π2 and the resulting
level of τ are aected by variations in the model's parameters.
Example 1: changes in the average income w̄
We x α = 1/3, w1 = 0.4, w2 = 1, n2 = 0.9, n1 = 0.05 and vary the income of the rich w3 to generate
dierent levels of the average income w̄. We follow the usual assumption that the average income is higher
than the median income (w2). Table 1 presents the optimal values of π2 and the resulting values of τ for
dierent levels of w̄.
Table 1: Changes in w̄
w̄ π2 τ w̄ π2 τ w̄ π2 τ
1.1 0.912359 0.939071 1.6 0.403743 0.62108 2.1 0.264809 0.592558
1.2 0.778954 0.839325 1.7 0.362559 0.608064 2.2 0.249406 0.592772
1.3 0.638997 0.74196 1.8 0.331594 0.602422 2.3 0.236076 0.593735
1.4 0.53309 0.679252 1.9 0.304295 0.595725 2.4 0.224409 0.59524
1.5 0.45819 0.642688 2 0.282844 0.593394 2.5 0.214099 0.597141
As we can see from the table, the optimal value of π2 decreases when w̄ goes up, but it seems that
the decreases are sharper at lower values of w̄ than at higher ones. On the other hand, the relationship
between the equilibrium tax rate and w̄ is non monotonic: at rst, τ is decreasing with w̄, but when w̄
reaches a suciently high level, τ starts increasing with further increases in w̄. This can be understood
by noting that τ depends on w̄ in two ways: directly and through π2. It can be veried from (5) that the
direct eect is positive (indeed, when the average income is higher, there is more to gain from increasing
the tax rate), while we also know that ∂τ/∂π2 > 0. At lower levels of w̄, there are strong decreases in
π2, which results in τ decreasing as well, but at higher levels of w̄, when the decreases in π2 are not that
strong, the positive direct eect of w̄ starts prevailing and so τ starts increasing. Note, however, that this
happens only when the income inequality, that is the dierence between w̄ and w2, is substantially large.
Example 2: changes in the median income w2
We x α = 1/3, w1 = 0.4, w̄ = 2, n2 = 0.9, n1 = 0.05 and vary the level of the median income w2.
Since we are keeping w̄ xed as w2 changes we are also varying w3 (but in the opposite direction). Again
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we assume that the average income is higher than the median income. The optimal values of π2 and the
resulting values of τ for dierent levels of w2 are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Changes in w2
w2 π2 τ w2 π2 τ
0.6 0.157256 0.613959 1.3 0.447337 0.650371
0.7 0.183455 0.601075 1.4 0.530541 0.69581
0.8 0.212429 0.593275 1.5 0.632935 0.760523
0.9 0.245135 0.590556 1.6 0.746212 0.838318
1 0.282844 0.593394 1.7 0.847216 0.908221
1.1 0.327308 0.602853 1.8 0.919531 0.955396
1.2 0.380995 0.620824 1.9 0.964649 0.98207
We can see from the table that the optimal value of π2 increases when w2 goes up. The increases are
smaller at lower values of w2, then become stronger as w2 increases and tend to become a bit smaller again
at high levels of w2. The reaction of τ is again non monotonic: at lower levels of w2 it is decreasing, but
then starts going up, even though the rise slows down at high levels of w2. The underlying intuition is
again that τ depends on w2 both directly and through π2. It can be veried from (5) that the direct eect
is negative: indeed, a higher w2 increases the cost of taxation to the individuals of type 2. On the other
hand, increases in π2 aect the equilibrium tax rate positively. At lower levels of w2, when the increases
in π2 are small, the negative direct eect prevails and τ is decreasing. However, when the increases in π2
become larger, τ starts increasing because of the positive indirect eect. As the rise in π2 slows down at
high levels of w2, so does the rise in τ , even though the increasing trend remains.
Example 3: changes in α
Finally, we explore the impact of the parameter α of the iso-elastic utility function which represents the
relative risk aversion of the individual. We x w1 = 0.4, w2 = 1, w̄ = 2, n2 = 0.9, n1 = 0.05 and vary α.
The optimal values of π2 and the resulting values of τ for dierent levels of α are presented in Table 4.
Table 3: Changes in α
α π2 τ α π2 τ
1/5 0.184006 0.699958 1/2 0.436216 0.586621
1/4 0.220198 0.647212 2/3 0.684658 0.728688
1/3 0.282844 0.593394 3/4 0.839802 0.852863
It can be seen from the table that the optimal value of π2 is increasing in α. Intuitively, when the
middle-class individuals become more risk averse, a higher probability for them to benet from the public
scheme is needed to ensure their support for the program. On the other hand, the eect of α on τ is
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non monotonic: the tax rate rst decreases and then starts increasing with α. This can be explained by
the following reasoning. Intuitively, a more risk averse individual prefers a lower tax rate, and this eect
prevails at lower levels of α. However, at higher levels of α, this negative eect becomes outweighed by
the positive impact of a rapidly increasing probability to benet from the public scheme, which reverses
the direction of the change in τ .
5 Conclusion
There is a long-standing controversy over the question of whether targeting social transfers towards the
bottom part of the income distribution actually enhances or weakens their redistributive impact. From an
eciency standpoint, targeting is clearly desirable, but at the same time it lacks political sustainability.
One indeed observes an inverse relationship at the country level between social transfer targeting and
redistributive impact. As observed by Korpi and Palme (1998), the more we target benets at the poor,
the less likely we are to reduce poverty and inequality. In this paper we address this question through
a simple political economy model that reects the idea that the middle class would be allowed to benet
from social transfers in a stochastic way. In the real world, there are many factors that can explain why
some people have access to benets to which they are not primarily entitled and others do not. They are
related to risk aversion, compliance level, public spirit, etc. Studying these factors is beyond the scope
of our paper. Here we limit ourselves to show that there may exist a (strictly positive) probability of
providing the social transfers to the middle class that strikes a balance between social optimality and
political sustainability.
To assess how this probability and the resulting tax evolve when the parameters of the model change,
we had to resort to a numerical illustration. The main nding of this simulation is that as income
inequality increases (measured by the dierence between average income and the income of the middle
class) the probability of letting the middle-class benet from the public program decreases consistently; see
exmaples 1 and 2. In other words, means testing should be enforced in a stricter way in unequal societies
than in more egalitarian countries. Intuitively, as w3 increases, type 2 benets more from the program so
that a Rawlsian government can decrease π2 which leaves more resources for the poor, while continuing to
ensure political support. Another interesting nding concerns risk aversion. As the coecient of relative
risk aversion increases, the probability of the middle-class beneting from the public program increases
all the way. Since benets are random for the middle class, it takes a higher probability is required to
bribe them into supporting the program. These results are interesting for their own sake because they
provide guidance for the design of meants-tested public policies and show how these are aected by two
of a society's main characteristics, namely inequality and risk aversion. Since these characteristics are
country specic the results also provide testable implications that can be explored in empirical studies.
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